On Tahoe and earlier, ScreenCapture permissions can disappear and not return. Customers are having an issue with this disappearing and when our code executes CGRequestScreenCaptureAccess() nothing happens, the prompt does not appear.
I can reproduce this by using the "-" button and removing the entry in the settings, then adding it back with the "+" button. CGPreflightScreenCaptureAccess() always returns the correct value but once the entry has been removed, CGRequestScreenCaptureAccess() requires a reboot before it will work again.
General
RSS for tagPrioritize user privacy and data security in your app. Discuss best practices for data handling, user consent, and security measures to protect user information.
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When developing and testing using my phone I got prompted for allowing app tracking. I later uploaded a build to TestFlight, deleted the old testing app and installed the TestFlight build. I am now stuck in an infinite loop of not getting prompted for allowing app tracking for the app. When entering the app settings the toggle for tracking never appears which leaves me not able to enter the app's content. My guess is that the prompt can only be shown once for the app bundle, but there has to be a way for me to get prompted again without changing the app bundle id. Help is appreciated since this app is scheduled to be published in a week.
Can someone please guide me on the entire process of integrating ads in an IOS application using google's admob sdk? Not related to code but things related to Apple's privacy policy. Which options do need to select or specify in my app profile's privacy policy (identifier) section?
Hi,
This issue is happening during Passkey creation.
We’ve observed that approximately 1% of our customer users encounter a persistent error during Passkey creation. For the vast majority, the process works as expected.
We believe our apple-app-site-association file is correctly configured, served directly from the RP ID over HTTPS without redirects, and is up-to-date. This setup appears to work for most users, and it seems the Apple CDN cache reflects the latest version of the file.
To help us diagnose and address the issue for the affected users, we would appreciate guidance on the following:
What tools or steps does Apple recommend to identify the root cause of this issue?
Are there any known recovery steps we can suggest to users to resolve this on affected devices?
Is there a way to force a refresh of the on-device cache for the apple-app-site-association file?
Thank you in advance for any input or guidance.
I keep getting the following error when trying to run Passkey sign in on macOS.
Told not to present authorization sheet: Error Domain=com.apple.AuthenticationServicesCore.AuthorizationError Code=1 "(null)"
ASAuthorizationController credential request failed with error: Error Domain=com.apple.AuthenticationServices.AuthorizationError Code=1004 "(null)"
This is the specific error.
Application with identifier a is not associated with domain b
I have config the apple-app-site-association link and use ?mode=developer
Could there be any reason for this?
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
Tags:
macOS
Objective-C
Authentication Services
Passkeys in iCloud Keychain
The One-time codes documentation details how to enable autofill for SMS based codes. However, there is no details about how to correctly implement autofill for email based codes.
I am observing the email based autofill works inconsistently when using email based OTC. In my application:
There is latency of 10-15 seconds from when the email arrives to when it is available for autofill.
After the autofill feature is used, the OTC email is not being deleted from the inbox automatically.
Without documentation, it's unclear to me what I might be doing wrong that is causing these side effects.
I found an ietf proposal for how autofill with email based codes might work, but it’s unclear if this is how Apple has implemented the feature: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-wells-origin-bound-one-time-codes-00.html#name-email
Existing docs for Autofill using SMS: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/enabling-autofill-for-domain-bound-sms-codes
Hi Apple Developer Support,
I’m building a macOS app that acts as a default browser. I can confirm that I can set it correctly through System Settings → Default Web Browser.
The app implements ASWebAuthenticationSessionWebBrowserSessionHandling to intercept Single Sign-On (SSO) flows. To handle requests, it presents SSO pages in a WKWebView embedded in a window that this app creates and owns - this works perfectly for the initial login flow.
However, after I close my WebView window and then launch Safari or Chrome, any subsequent SSO requests open in the newly-launched browser instead of my custom browser, even though it remains selected as the default in System Settings.
I’d appreciate any insight on why the system “hands off” to Safari/Chrome in this scenario, and how I can keep my app consistently intercepting all ASWebAuthenticationSession requests.
Here are the steps that break down the issue:
Launch & confirm that the custom default browser app is the default browser in System Settings → Default Web Browser.
Trigger SSO (e.g., try to log in to Slack).
App’s WKWebView appears, and the SSO UI works end-to-end.
Close the WebView window (I have windowShouldClose callback where I cancel the pending session).
Manually launch Safari or Chrome.
Trigger SSO again. Observed behaviour: the login URL opens in Safari/Chrome.
I am using macOS 15.3.2
Hey everyone, I'm hitting a really frustrating issue with App Attest. My app was working perfectly with DCAppAttestService on October 12th, but starting October 13th it started failing with DCError Code 2 "Failed to fetch App UUID" at DCAppAttestController.m:153. The weird part is I didn't change any code - same implementation, same device, same everything.
I've tried switching between development and production entitlement modes, re-registered my device in the Developer Portal, created fresh provisioning profiles with App Attest capability, and verified that my App ID has App Attest enabled. DCAppAttestService.isSupported returns true, so the device supports it. Has anyone else run into this? This is blocking my production launch and I'm not sure if it's something on my end or an Apple infrastructure issue.
Hi Apple Developer Team,
I am encountering an issue with the “Sign in with Apple” feature. While implementing this functionality in my dotnet application, I noticed that the user’s first name and last name are not being returned, even though I have explicitly requested the name scope. However, the email and other requested information are returned successfully.
Here are the details of my implementation: 1. Scope Requested: name, email 2. Response Received: Email and other data are present, but fullName is missing or null. 3. Expected Behavior: I expected to receive the user’s first and last name as per the fullName scope.
I have verified the implementation and ensured that the correct scopes are being passed in the request.
Could you please help clarify the following? 1. Are there specific conditions under which Apple may not return the user’s fullName despite the scope being requested? 2. Is there a recommended approach or fallback mechanism to handle this scenario? 3. Could this behavior be related to a limitation or change in the API, or might it be an issue on my end?
I also came to know that for initial sign in the user details will be displayed in the signin-apple payload as Form data but how do I fetch those form-data from the signin-apple request, please suggest
I would greatly appreciate any guidance or solutions to resolve this issue.
Thank you for your support!
I’ve explained this point many times on the forums, so I figured I’d write it up properly once and for all.
If you have questions or comments, start a new thread in Privacy & Security > General and add the App Sandbox tag. That way I’ll be sure to see it.
Share and Enjoy
—
Quinn “The Eskimo!” @ Developer Technical Support @ Apple
let myEmail = "eskimo" + "1" + "@" + "apple.com"
The Case for Sandboxing a Directly Distributed App
Many folks consider the App Sandbox to be a binary choice:
“My app ships in the Mac App Store, so I must sandbox it.”
“I directly distribute my app, so I’ll ignore the App Sandbox.”
However, those are not your only options. In many cases it makes sense to sandbox a directly distributed app. Sandboxing your app has at least three benefits:
It enables app container protection. See Trusted Execution Resources for a link to more info on that.
If your app includes any app extensions, it simplifies your development experience because your app and its extensions run in a similar environment.
It improves your app’s security (although the actual benefits vary based on the specifics of your app).
Sandboxing some apps can be tricky because of the additional security limits applied by the sandbox. However, in a directly distributed app you have access to two techniques that are not available to Mac App Store apps:
Temporary exception entitlements
Non-sandboxed XPC services
Temporary exception entitlements
Use temporary exception entitlements to selectively disable specific sandbox security limits.
Imagine, for example, that you’re creating a simple document-based app that’s generally compatible with the sandbox. However, that app needs to send an Apple event to Music to create a playlist. That Apple event is blocked by the sandbox. You don’t need to disable the entire App Sandbox just to get around this security limit. Instead, use the com.apple.security.temporary-exception.apple-events entitlement to open a small hole in the sandbox.
There are temporary exception entitlements to disable most sandbox security limits. For more information about them, follow the link in App Sandbox Resources.
IMPORTANT Don’t be alarmed by the temporary in temporary exception entitlements. That word makes sense when you view this from the Mac App Store perspective. Back in the early days of the Mac App Store, some apps were allowed to use temporary exception entitlements because of limitations in the App Sandbox. Once App Sandbox was sufficiently enhanced, these temporary exception entitlements were no longer allowed in the Mac App Store. However, there’s nothing temporary about the implementation of these entitlements. They work today and are expected to continue working in the future. Using them in a directly distributed app is not a problem.
Non-sandboxed XPC services
Not all sandbox security limits have a corresponding temporary exception entitlement. For example, the sandbox prevents you from sending a Unix signal to other processes, and there’s no temporary exception entitlement to allow that.
If you run into such a limit, move that code to a non-sandboxed XPC service, then have the main app request that the XPC service perform the operation on its behalf.
An XPC service can be useful even when there is a temporary exception entitlement to disable a specific sandbox security limit. Continuing the Apple event example from above, if you put the code that sends the Apple event into an XPC service, you only need to apply the temporary exception entitlement to that service, not to your app as a whole.
Conclusion
If you directly distribute your app, consider enabling the App Sandbox. It has some important benefits, and it might be more feasible than you think.
Hello,
We are working on integrating app integrity verification into our service application, following Apple's App Attest and DeviceCheck guide.
Our server issues a challenge to the client, which then sends the challenge, attestation, and keyId in CBOR format to Apple's App Attest server for verification. However, we are unable to reach both https://attest.apple.com and https://attest.development.apple.com due to network issues.
These attempts have been made from both our internal corporate network and mobile hotspot environments. Despite adjusting DNS settings and other configurations, the issue persists.
Are there alternative methods or solutions to address this problem? Any recommended network configurations or guidelines to successfully connect to Apple's App Attest servers would be greatly appreciated.
Thank you.
I regularly see folks confused by the difference in behaviour of app groups between macOS and iOS. There have been substantial changes in this space recently. While much of this is now covered in the official docs (r. 92322409), I’ve updated this post to go into all the gory details.
If you have questions or comments, start a new thread with the details. Put it in the App & System Services > Core OS topic area and tag it with Code Signing and Entitlements. Oh, and if your question is about app group containers, also include Files and Storage.
Share and Enjoy
—
Quinn “The Eskimo!” @ Developer Technical Support @ Apple
let myEmail = "eskimo" + "1" + "@" + "apple.com"
App Groups: macOS vs iOS: Working Towards Harmony
There are two styles of app group ID:
iOS-style app group IDs start with group., for example, group.eskimo1.test.
macOS-style app group IDs start with your Team ID, for example, SKMME9E2Y8.eskimo1.test.
This difference has been the source of numerous weird problems over the years. Starting in Feb 2025, iOS-style app group IDs are fully supported on macOS for all product types [1]. If you’re writing new code that uses app groups, use an iOS-style app group ID. If you have existing code that uses a macOS-style app group ID, consider how you might transition to the iOS style.
IMPORTANT The Feb 2025 changes aren’t tied to an OS release but rather to a Developer website update. For more on this, see Feb 2025 Changes, below.
[1] If your product is a standalone executable, like a daemon or agent, wrap it in an app-like structure, as explained in Signing a daemon with a restricted entitlement.
iOS-Style App Group IDs
An iOS-style app group ID has the following features:
It starts with the group. prefix, for example, group.eskimo1.test.
You allocate it on the Developer website. This assigns the app group ID to your team.
You then claim access to it by listing it in the App Groups entitlement (com.apple.security.application-groups) entitlement.
That claim must be authorised by a provisioning profile [1]. The Developer website will only let you include your team’s app group IDs in your profile.
For more background on provisioning profiles, see TN3125 Inside Code Signing: Provisioning Profiles.
iOS-style app group IDs originated on iOS with iOS 3.0. They’ve always been supported on iOS’s child platforms (iPadOS, tvOS, visionOS, and watchOS). On the Mac:
They’ve been supported by Mac Catalyst since that technology was introduced.
Likewise for iOS Apps on Mac.
Starting in Feb 2025, they’re supported for other Mac products.
[1] Strictly speaking macOS does not require that, but if your claim is not authorised by a profile then you might run into other problems. See Entitlements-Validated Flag, below.
macOS-Style App Group IDs
A macOS-style app group ID has the following features:
It should start with your Team ID [1], for example, SKMME9E2Y8.eskimo1.test.
It can’t be explicitly allocated on the Developer website.
Code that isn’t sandboxed doesn’t need to claim the app group ID in the App Groups entitlement. [2]
To use an app group, claim the app group ID in the App Groups entitlement.
The App Groups entitlement is not restricted on macOS, meaning that this claim doesn’t need to be authorised by a provisioning profile [3].
However, if you claim an app group ID that’s not authorised in some way, you might run into problems. More on that later in this post.
If you submit an app to the Mac App Store, the submission process checks that your app group IDs make sense, that is, they either start with your Team ID (macOS style) or are assigned to your team (iOS style).
[1] This is “should” because, historically, macOS has not actually required it. However, that’s now changing, with things like app group container protection.
[2] This was true prior to macOS 15. It may still technically be true in macOS 15 and later, but the most important thing, access to the app group container, requires the entitlement because of app group container protection.
[3] Technically it’s a validation-required entitlement, something that we’ll come back to in the Entitlements-Validated Flag section.
Feb 2025 Changes
On 21 Feb 2025 we rolled out a change to the Developer website that completes the support for iOS-style app group IDs on the Mac. Specifically, it’s now possible to create a Mac provisioning profile that authorises the use of an iOS-style app group ID.
Note This change doesn’t affect Mac Catalyst or iOS Apps on Mac, which have always been able to use iOS-style app group IDs on the Mac.
Prior to this change it was possible to use an iOS-style app group ID on the Mac but that might result in some weird behaviour. Later sections of this post describe some of those problems. Of course, that information is now only of historical interest because, if you’re using an iOS-style app group, you can and should authorise that use with a provisioning profile.
We also started seeding Xcode 16.3, which has since been release. This is aware of the Developer website change, and its Signing & Capabilities editor actively encourages you to use iOS-style app groups IDs in all products.
Note This Xcode behaviour is the only option for iOS and its child platforms. With Xcode 16.3, it’s now the default for macOS as well. If you have existing project, enable this behaviour using the Register App Groups build setting.
Finally, we updated a number of app group documentation pages, including App Groups entitlement and Configuring app groups.
Crossing the Streams
In some circumstances you might need to have a single app that accesses both an iOS- and a macOS-style app group. For example:
You have a macOS app.
You want to migrate to an iOS-style app group ID, perhaps because you want to share an app group container with a Mac Catalyst app.
But you also need to access existing content in a container identified by a macOS-style app group ID.
Historically this caused problems (FB16664827) but, as of Jun 2025, this is fully supported (r. 148552377).
When the Developer website generates a Mac provisioning profile for an App ID with the App Groups capability, it automatically adds TEAM_ID.* to the list of app group IDs authorised by that profile (where TEAM_ID is your Team ID). This allows the app to claim access to every iOS-style app group ID associated with the App ID and any macOS-style app group IDs for that team. This helps in two circumstances:
It avoids any Mac App Store Connect submission problems, because App Store Connect can see that the app’s profile authorises its use of all the it app group IDs it claims access to.
Outside of App Store — for example, when you directly distribute an app using Developer ID signing — you no longer have to rely on macOS granting implicit access to macOS-style app group IDs. Rather, such access is explicitly authorised by your profile. That ensures that your entitlements remain validated, as discussed in the Entitlements-Validated Flag, below.
A Historical Interlude
These different styles of app group IDs have historical roots:
On iOS, third-party apps have always used provisioning profiles, and thus the App Groups entitlement is restricted just like any other entitlement.
On macOS, support for app groups was introduced before macOS had general support for provisioning profiles [1], and thus the App Groups entitlement is unrestricted.
The unrestricted nature of this entitlement poses two problems. The first is accidental collisions. How do you prevent folks from accidentally using an app group ID that’s in use by some other developer?
On iOS this is easy: The Developer website assigns each app group ID to a specific team, which guarantees uniqueness. macOS achieved a similar result by using the Team ID as a prefix.
The second problem is malicious reuse. How do you prevent a Mac app from accessing the app group containers of some other team?
Again, this isn’t an issue on iOS because the App Groups entitlement is restricted. On macOS the solution was for the Mac App Store to prevent you from publishing an app that used an app group ID that’s used by another team.
However, this only works for Mac App Store apps. Directly distributed apps were free to access app group containers of any other app. That was considered acceptable back when the Mac App Store was first introduced. That’s no longer the case, which is why macOS 15 introduced app group container protection. See App Group Container Protection, below.
[1] I’m specifically talking about provisioning profiles for directly distributed apps, that is, apps using Developer ID signing.
Entitlements-Validated Flag
The fact that the App Groups entitlement is unrestricted on macOS is, when you think about it, a little odd. The purpose of entitlements is to gate access to functionality. If an entitlement isn’t restricted, it’s not much of a gate!
For most unrestricted entitlements that’s not a problem. Specifically, for both the App Sandbox and Hardened Runtime entitlements, those are things you opt in to, so macOS is happy to accept the entitlement at face value. After all, if you want to cheat you can just not opt in [1].
However, this isn’t the case for the App Groups entitlement, which actually gates access to functionality. Dealing with this requires macOS to walk a fine line between security and compatibility. Part of that solution is the entitlements-validated flag.
When a process runs an executable, macOS checks its entitlements. There are two categories:
Restricted entitlements must be authorised by a provisioning profile. If your process runs an executable that claims a restricted entitlement that’s not authorised by a profile, the system traps.
Unrestricted entitlements don’t have to be authorised by a provisioning profile; they can be used by any code at any time.
However, the App Groups entitlement is a special type of unrestricted entitlement called a validation-required entitlement. If a process runs an executable that claims a validation-required entitlement and that claim is not authorised by a profile, the system allows the process to continue running but clears its entitlements-validated flag.
Some subsystems gate functionality on the entitlements-validated flag. For example, the data protection keychain uses entitlements as part of its access control model, but refuses to honour those entitlements if the entitlement-validated flag has been cleared.
Note If you’re curious about this flag, use the procinfo subcommand of launchctl to view it. For example:
% sudo launchctl procinfo `pgrep Test20230126`
…
code signing info = valid
…
entitlements validated
…
If the flag has been cleared, this line will be missing from the code signing info section.
Historically this was a serious problem because it prevented you from creating an app that uses both app groups and the data protection keychain [2] (r. 104859788). Fortunately that’s no longer an issue because the Developer website now lets you include the App Groups entitlement in macOS provisioning profiles.
[1] From the perspective of macOS checking entitlements at runtime. There are other checks:
The App Sandbox is mandatory for Mac App Store apps, but that’s checked when you upload the app to App Store Connect.
Directly distributed apps must be notarised to pass Gatekeeper, and the notary service requires that all executables enable the hardened runtime.
[2] See TN3137 On Mac keychain APIs and implementations for more about the data protection keychain.
App Groups and the Keychain
The differences described above explain a historical oddity associated with keychain access. The Sharing access to keychain items among a collection of apps article says:
Application groups
When you collect related apps into an application group using
the App Groups entitlement, they share access to a
group container, and gain the ability to message each other in
certain ways. You can use app group names as keychain access
group names, without adding them to the Keychain Access Groups
entitlement.
On iOS this makes a lot of sense:
The App Groups entitlement is a restricted entitlement on iOS.
The Developer website assigns each iOS-style app group ID to a specific team, which guarantees uniqueness.
The required group. prefix means that these keychain access groups can’t collide with other keychain access groups, which all start with an App ID prefix (there’s also Apple-only keychain access groups that start with other prefixes, like apple).
However, this didn’t work on macOS [1] because the App Groups entitlement is unrestricted there. However, with the Feb 2025 changes it should now be possible to use an iOS-style app group ID as a keychain access group on macOS.
Note I say “should” because I’ve not actually tried it (-:
Keep in mind that standard keychain access groups are protected the same way on all platforms, using the restricted Keychain Access Groups entitlement (keychain-access-groups).
[1] Except for Mac Catalyst apps and iOS Apps on Mac.
Not Entirely Unsatisfied
When you launch a Mac app that uses app groups you might see this log entry:
type: error
time: 10:41:35.858009+0000
process: taskgated-helper
subsystem: com.apple.ManagedClient
category: ProvisioningProfiles
message: com.example.apple-samplecode.Test92322409: Unsatisfied entitlements: com.apple.security.application-groups
Note The exact format of that log entry, and the circumstances under which it’s generated, varies by platform. On macOS 13.0.1 I was able to generate it by running a sandboxed app that claims a macOS-style app group ID in the App Groups entitlement and also claims some other restricted entitlement.
This looks kinda worrying and can be the source of problems. It means that the App Groups entitlement claims an entitlement that’s not authorised by a provisioning profile. On iOS this would trap, but on macOS the system allows the process to continue running. It does, however, clear the entitlements-validate flag. See Entitlements-Validated Flag for an in-depth discussion of this.
The easiest way to avoid this problem is to authorise your app group ID claims with a provisioning profile. If there’s some reason you can’t do that, watch out for potential problems with:
The data protection keychain — See the discussion of that in the Entitlements-Validated Flag and App Groups and the Keychain sections, both above.
App group container protection — See App Group Container Protection, below.
App Group Container Protection
macOS 15 introduced app group container protection. To access an app group container without user intervention:
Claim access to the app group by listing its ID in the App Groups entitlement.
Locate the container by calling the containerURL(forSecurityApplicationGroupIdentifier:) method.
Ensure that at least one of the following criteria are met:
Your app is deployed via the Mac App Store (A).
Or via TestFlight when running on macOS 15.1 or later (B).
Or the app group ID starts with your app’s Team ID (C).
Or your app’s claim to the app group is authorised by a provisioning profile embedded in the app (D) [1].
If your app doesn’t follow these rules, the system prompts the user to approve its access to the container. If granted, that consent applies only for the duration of that app instance.
For more on this, see:
The System Integrity Protection section of the macOS Sequoia 15 Release Notes
The System Integrity Protection section of the macOS Sequoia 15.1 Release Notes
WWDC 2024 Session 10123 What’s new in privacy, starting at 12:23
The above criteria mean that you rarely run into the app group authorisation prompt. If you encounter a case where that happens, feel free to start a thread here on DevForums. See the top of this post for info on the topic and tags to use.
Note Prior to the Feb 2025 change, things generally worked out fine when you app was deployed but you might’ve run into problems during development. That’s no longer the case.
[1] This is what allows Mac Catalyst and iOS Apps on Mac to work.
Revision History
2025-08-12 Added a reference to the Register App Groups build setting.
2025-07-28 Updated the Crossing the Streams section for the Jun 2025 change. Made other minor editorial changes.
2025-04-16 Rewrote the document now that iOS-style app group IDs are fully supported on the Mac. Changed the title from App Groups: macOS vs iOS: Fight! to App Groups: macOS vs iOS: Working Towards Harmony
2025-02-25 Fixed the Xcode version number mentioned in yesterday’s update.
2025-02-24 Added a quick update about the iOS-style app group IDs on macOS issue.
2024-11-05 Further clarified app group container protection. Reworked some other sections to account for this new reality.
2024-10-29 Clarified the points in App Group Container Protection.
2024-10-23 Fleshed out the discussion of app group container protection on macOS 15.
2024-09-04 Added information about app group container protection on macOS 15.
2023-01-31 Renamed the Not Entirely Unsatisfactory section to Not Entirely Unsatisfied. Updated it to describe the real impact of that log message.
2022-12-12 First posted.
Hi,
I am developing a Platform SSO in order to have integrated with our IdP, which I am also adapting to provide the right endpoints for Platform SSO.
I have a few questions about the implementation:
does the client-request-id need to be present on all requests? Is it unique per request, or requests that are bound together like those requesting a nonce and those who will use that nonce should use the same client-request-id?
I am not sure how the loginManager.presentRegistrationViewController works. I'd like to get the user to authenticate to my IdP before device registration. So I am not sure if I should provide my own Webview or something similar or if this method should do something for me;
My idea is to request user authentication once, save the state when performing device registration, so that I avoid asking for user authentication twice when performing user registration. Is this the right way to do it?
How does platform SSO handles tokens? If one application of my IdP requests the authentication on a common OIDC/OAuth2 flow, should I perform some sort of token exchange?
How about SAML? Platform SSO seems to be token-centric, but how does one handle SAML flows? Is it by using WebView as well?
Hi,
I’m currently implementing App Attest attestation validation on the development server.
However, I’m receiving a 403 Forbidden response when I POST a CBOR-encoded payload to the following endpoint:
curl -X POST
-H "Content-Type: application/cbor"
--data-binary @payload.cbor
'https://data-development.appattest.apple.com'
Here’s how I’m generating the CBOR payload in Java:
Map<String, Object> payload = new HashMap<>();
payload.put("attestation", attestationBytes); // byte[] from DCAppAttestService
payload.put("clientDataHash", clientDataHash); // SHA-256 hash of the challenge (byte[])
payload.put("keyId", keyIdBytes); // Base64-decoded keyId (byte[])
payload.put("appId", TEAM_ID + "." + BUNDLE_ID); // e.g., "ABCDE12345.com.example.app"
ObjectMapper cborMapper = new ObjectMapper(new CBORFactory());
byte[] cborBody = cborMapper.writeValueAsBytes(payload);
I’m unsure whether the endpoint is rejecting the payload format or if the endpoint itself is incorrect for this stage.
I’d appreciate clarification on the following:
1. Is https://data-development.appattest.apple.com the correct endpoint for key attestation in a development environment?
2. Should this endpoint accept CBOR-encoded payloads, or is it only for JSON-based assertion validation?
3. Is there a current official Apple documentation that lists:
• the correct URLs for key attestation and assertion validation (production and development),
• or any server-side example code (e.g., Java, Python) for handling attestation/validation on the backend?
So far, I couldn’t find an official document that explicitly describes the expected HTTP endpoints for these operations.
If there’s a newer guide or updated API reference, I’d appreciate a link.
Thanks in advance for your help.
Our company has a micro service which sends a notification email to an iCloud account/email and the email is going to the junk folder. As we tested, the email generated from user-field.company.com goes to the Inbox, while the email from user-dev.company.com goes to the Junk folder. Is there a way to avoid sending the emails to client's Junk folder when the email is sent from a specific company domain?
I can't find any information about why this is happening, nor can I reproduce the 'successful' state on this device. My team needs to understand this behavior, so any insight would be greatly appreciated!
The expected behavior: If I delete both apps and reinstall them, attempting to open the second app from my app should trigger the system confirmation dialog.
The specifics: I'm using the MSAL library. It navigates the user to the Microsoft Authenticator app and then returns to my app. However, even after resetting the phone and reinstalling both apps, the dialog never shows up (it just opens the app directly).
Does anyone know the logic behind how iOS handles these prompts or why it might be persistent even after a reset?
Thanks in advance!
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
We're experiencing crashes in our production iOS app related to Apple's DeviceCheck framework. The crash occurs in DCAnalytics internal performance tracking, affecting some specific versions of iOS 18 (18.4.1, 18.5.0).
Crash Signature
CoreFoundation: -[__NSDictionaryM setObject:forKeyedSubscript:] + 460
DeviceCheck: -[DCAnalytics sendPerformanceForCategory:eventType:] + 236
Observed Patterns
Scenario 1 - Token Generation:
Crashed: com.appQueue
EXC_BAD_ACCESS KERN_INVALID_ADDRESS 0x0000000000000010
DeviceCheck: -[DCDevice generateTokenWithCompletionHandler:]
Thread: Background dispatch queue
Scenario 2 - Support Check:
Crashed: com.apple.main-thread
EXC_BAD_ACCESS KERN_INVALID_ADDRESS 0x0000000000000008
DeviceCheck: -[DCDevice _isSupportedReturningError:]
DeviceCheck: -[DCDevice isSupported]
Thread: Main thread
Root Cause Analysis
The DCAnalytics component within DeviceCheck attempts to insert a nil value into an NSMutableDictionary when recording performance metrics, indicating missing nil validation before dictionary operations.
Reproduction Context
Crashes occur during standard DeviceCheck API usage:
Calling DCDevice.isSupported property
Calling DCDevice.generateToken(completionHandler:) (triggered by Firebase App Check SDK)
Both operations invoke internal analytics that fail with nil insertion attempts.
Concurrency Considerations
We've implemented sequential access guards around DeviceCheck token generation to prevent race conditions, yet crashes persist. This suggests the issue likely originates within the DeviceCheck framework's internal implementation rather than concurrent access from our application code.
Note: Scenario 2 occurs through Firebase SDK's App Check integration, which internally uses DeviceCheck for attestation.
Request
Can Apple engineering confirm if this is a known issue with DeviceCheck's analytics subsystem? Is there a recommended workaround to disable DCAnalytics or ensure thread-safe DeviceCheck API usage?
Any guidance on preventing these crashes would be appreciated.
I'm experiencing a strange issue where ASWebAuthenticationSession works perfectly when running from Xcode (both Debug and Release), but fails on TestFlight builds.
The setup:
iOS app using ASWebAuthenticationSession for OIDC login (Keycloak)
Custom URL scheme callback (myapp://)
prefersEphemeralWebBrowserSession = false
The issue:
When using iOS Keychain autofill (with Face ID/Touch ID or normal iphone pw, that auto-submits the form) -> works perfectly
When manually typing credentials and clicking the login button -> fails with white screen
When it fails, the form POST from Keycloak back to my server (/signin-oidc) never reaches the server at all. The authentication session just shows a white screen.
Reproduced on:
Multiple devices (iPhone 15 Pro, etc.)
iOS 18.x
Xcode 16.x
Multiple TestFlight testers confirmed same behavior
What I've tried:
Clearing Safari cookies/data
prefersEphemeralWebBrowserSession = true and false
Different SameSite cookie policies on server
Verified custom URL scheme is registered and works (testing myapp://test in Safari opens the app)
Why custom URL scheme instead of Universal Links:
We couldn't get Universal Links to trigger from a js redirect (window.location.href) within ASWebAuthenticationSession. Only custom URL schemes seemed to be intercepted. If there's a way to make Universal Links work in this context, without a manual user-interaction we'd be happy to try.
iOS Keychain autofill works
The only working path is iOS Keychain autofill that requires iphone-authentication and auto-submits the form. Any manual form submission fails, but only on TestFlight - not Xcode builds.
Has anyone encountered this or know a workaround?
Hi, I’ve added attestation to my app, and everything worked as expected during setup. However, after deployment, I noticed some unknownSystemFailure entries in the production logs on New Relic. Could you help me understand what typically causes this error? The documentation suggests issues such as failing to generate a token. What scenarios could lead to that?
Estou compartilhando algumas observações técnicas sobre Crash Detection / Emergency SOS no ecossistema Apple, com base em eventos amplamente observados em 2022 e 2024, quando houve chamadas automáticas em massa para serviços de emergência.
A ideia aqui não é discutir UX superficial ou “edge cases isolados”, mas sim comportamento sistêmico em escala, algo que acredito ser relevante para qualquer time que trabalhe com sistemas críticos orientados a eventos físicos.
Contexto resumido
A partir do iPhone 14, a Detecção de Acidente passou a correlacionar múltiplos sensores (acelerômetros de alta faixa, giroscópio, GPS, microfones) para inferir eventos de impacto severo e acionar automaticamente chamadas de emergência. Em 2022, isso resultou em um volume significativo de falsos positivos, especialmente em atividades com alta aceleração (esqui, snowboard, parques de diversão). Em 2024, apesar de ajustes, houve recorrência localizada do mesmo padrão.
Ponto técnico central
O problema não parece ser hardware, nem um “bug pontual”, mas sim o estado intermediário de decisão:
Aceleração ≠ acidente
Ruído ≠ impacto real
Movimento extremo ≠ incapacidade humana
Quando o classificador entra em estado ambíguo, o sistema depende de uma janela curta de confirmação humana (toque/voz). Em ambientes ruidosos, com o usuário em movimento ou fisicamente ativo, essa confirmação frequentemente falha. O sistema então assume incapacidade e executa a ação fail-safe: chamada automática.
Do ponto de vista de engenharia de segurança, isso é compreensível. Do ponto de vista de escala, é explosivo.
Papel da Siri
A Siri não “decide” o acidente, mas é um elo sensível na cadeia humano–máquina. Falhas de compreensão por ruído, idioma, respiração ofegante ou ausência de resposta acabam sendo interpretadas como sinal de emergência real. Isso é funcionalmente equivalente ao que vemos em sistemas automotivos como o eCall europeu, quando a confirmação humana é inexistente ou degradada.
O dilema estrutural
Há um trade-off claro e inevitável:
Reduzir falsos negativos (não perder um acidente real)
Aumentar falsos positivos (chamadas indevidas)
Para o usuário individual, errar “para mais” faz sentido. Para serviços públicos de emergência, milhões de dispositivos errando “para mais” criam ruído operacional real.
Por que isso importa para developers
A Apple hoje opera, na prática, um dos maiores sistemas privados de segurança pessoal automatizada do mundo, interagindo diretamente com infraestrutura pública crítica. Isso coloca Crash Detection / SOS na mesma categoria de sistemas safety-critical, onde:
UX é parte da segurança
Algoritmos precisam ser auditáveis
“Human-in-the-loop” não pode ser apenas nominal
Reflexões abertas
Alguns pontos que, como developer, acho que merecem discussão:
Janelas de confirmação humana adaptativas ao contexto (atividade física, ruído).
Cancelamento visual mais agressivo em cenários de alto movimento.
Perfis de sensibilidade por tipo de atividade, claramente comunicados.
Critérios adicionais antes da chamada automática quando o risco de falso positivo é estatisticamente alto.
Não é um problema simples, nem exclusivo da Apple. É um problema de software crítico em contato direto com o mundo físico, operando em escala planetária. Justamente por isso, acho que vale uma discussão técnica aberta, sem ruído emocional.
Curioso para ouvir perspectivas de quem trabalha com sistemas similares (automotivo, wearables, safety-critical, ML embarcado).
— Rafa
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
Tags:
Siri Event Suggestions Markup
Core ML
App Intents
Communication Safety